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Dr Mathias Thaler 
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I don’t think we’re ever going to get to utopia again by going forward, but only 
roundabout or sideways. […] Increasingly often in these increasingly hard 
times I am asked by people I respect and admire, “Are you going to write books 
about the terrible injustice and misery of our world, or are you going to write 
escapist and consolatory fantasies?” […] I am offered the Grand Inquisitor’s 
choice. Will you choose freedom without happiness, or happiness without 
freedom? The only answer one can make, I think is: No. 
Ursula K. Le Guin1 
 
[Utopias] don’t speak to us trapped in this world as we are. […] Must redefine 
utopia. It isn’t the perfect end-product of our wishes, define it so and it deserves 
the scorn of those who sneer when they hear the word. No. Utopia is the 
process of making a better world, the name for one path history can take, a 
dynamic, tumultuous, agonizing process, with no end. Struggle forever. 
Kim Stanley Robinson2 
 
A start for any habitable utopia must be to overturn the ideological bullshit of 
empire and, unsentimentally but respectfully, to revisit the traduced and 
defamed cultures on the bones of which some conqueror’s utopian dreams 
were piled up. 
China Miéville3 
 
I. An Old Problem in Need of a New Articulation 
Is a realist orientation in political theory compatible with an interest in, or even an 
endorsement of, utopianism? This paper tries to answer affirmatively, by 
complicating the conventional picture of the relationship between realism and utopia. 
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The main argument I shall put forth is that, once we re-consider what realism is and 
what utopia is, we are in a position to conceive of their relationship in a mutually 
supportive, rather than reciprocally exclusive fashion. Distilled into an aphorism, we 
might express the underlying intuition like this: realism without utopia is status-quo-
affirming; utopia without realism is wishful thinking. 
The paper thus interrogates the widely promoted identification of realism with anti-
utopianism, and thereby discloses one possible way to deflect the charge of 
conservatism, which has frequently been levelled against realists of all stripes. To 
establish this argument, the essay steers attention to utopian fiction and introduces a 
reading of Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Dispossessed. Rather than focussing on the 
narrative content alone, the gist of this reading is to foreground the potential of 
literature to imaginatively expand the range of questions we ask in political theory. 
My ambition in the following is therefore to motivate the proposition that the genre 
of critical and antinomian utopias can productively unsettle the controversies in 
political theory.4 
Before elaborating on the substantive argument, a clarification on the paper’s goal is 
required. In my turn to Le Guin’s work, I pursue an ulterior motive, namely to outline 
ways in which the controversy between realists and moralists in political theory can 
move beyond a mere Methodenstreit.5 Part of the reason why the current debate has 
gravitated towards methodological issues concerning “how to do political theory” can 
be found in the lamentable fact that conceptual confusion surrounds almost all the 
terms of the debate. 
Nevertheless, I will in the following not aspire to elucidate what realism or utopia 
“actually mean”. Although there is merit in such an exercise of semantic investigation, 
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the paper seeks to establish that utopianism is short-changed when it is equated with 
wishful thinking alone; and that a denunciation of utopian thinking as wishful 
thinking has significant implications for our appreciation of realism’s potential to call 
for radical transformation. The essay therefore unravels the intricacies of utopianism 
through the lens of literary fiction, without pretending to resolve an ongoing 
controversy that will perhaps forever elude conclusive settlement. After all, ever since 
Thomas More coined the word “utopia” more than 500 years ago, its meaning has 
been deliberately exposed to conflicting interpretations, denoting at the same time a 
nowhere/no-place (ou-topia) and a virtuous, prosperous, Arcadian place (eu-topia).6 
Acknowledging the internal complexity of utopianism allows for a much-needed re-
negotiation of the ostensible dichotomy between realism and utopia.7 
Since the paper uncovers one possible path towards overcoming realism’s narrow 
fixation on methodological issues, a further caveat seems necessary: by concentrating 
on the interconnections between literature and political theory, I will exclude from my 
inquiry the third dimension of utopianism, namely various forms of lived experience 
that draw on the utopian imagination.8 
The plan for the paper is as follows: section II’s starting point is that the tension 
between realism and utopia cannot be defused by stipulating a harmonious 
compatibility between both poles; neither is it the case, however, that realism and 
utopian thinking are antipodes that define each other in their absolute opposition. 
Instead, the most auspicious way of conceiving the relationship between realism and 
utopia reveals itself once we shun both problematic reconciliations, like the proposal 
for a “real utopia” (Erik Olin Wright et al), and problematic oppositions, such as 
“dystopic liberalism” (Judith Shklar et al). 
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In section III, I grapple with Raymond Geuss’s efforts to locate the place of utopia in 
realist political theory, by drawing specifically on Theodor W. Adorno’s and Gustav 
Landauer’s writings. Building on insights from utopian studies, I then contend that 
viewing utopia as a persistent, iconoclastic form of “looking for the blue”, rather than 
as a static blueprint for a perfect society, can assist us in fleshing out Geuss’s 
reflections. 
The subsequent section IV embarks on a reading of Ursula K. Le Guin’s science fiction 
novel The Dispossessed. This text delivers an effective illustration of a different kind of 
utopianism that is compatible with realism: in depicting an anarchist experiment in a 
reflective, dynamic and ambiguous manner, Le Guin succeeds in conjuring a critical 
utopia that rejects the status quo without aiming to construct a perfect society.  
The paper’s final section V brings this interpretation of The Dispossessed to bear on the 
wider discussion in political theory and investigates utopianism’s deployment of 
cognitive estrangement. I maintain that realist political theorists can accrue 
considerable benefits from taking narratives of radically different worlds seriously: 
they break the spell of the here and now, and thereby throw the existing power 
structures and ideological formations into sharper relief. Utopian fiction, in short, can 
be useful for comprehending “what is” (thus helping us to soberly understand the 
world we currently inhabit) and for meditating on “what might be” (thus helping us 
to nurture the hope for a better future). It is in the interplay between these two modes 
of critical reflection that its value for political theory lies. 
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II. Two Problematic Solutions: “Real Utopias” and “Dystopic 
Liberalism” 
The past 10 years have seen increased attention to realism as an intellectual project, 
which challenges the prevalent “ethics first” conception of political theory.9 Realism 
within political theory is often thought to be antithetical to utopianism for at least two 
interrelated reasons. William Galston recapitulates these effectively when he 
highlights why realists should be considered “resolutely anti-utopian”10. On the one 
hand, realists are sceptical of the idea of linear, uninterrupted progress and thus 
distrustful of any programme for social change that discounts the high costs arising 
from political transformations. This is anti-utopianism in the guise of a pessimist 
attitude about the human capacity for peaceful coexistence and steady development. 
Given the permanence of conflict and strife, realists repudiate any appeal to pure 
consensus and agreement as wishful thinking. 
On the other hand, realism can be said to oppose utopianism because of its disregard 
for concerns with feasibility. Building castles in the sky is inadequate when we 
contemplate how to improve the world as it is. The sheer distance between the ideals 
of utopia and the dire state of the here and now undermines the actual impact that 
social criticism needs to have. This occasions the common complaint that utopianism 
is problematic because its proposals to transform the status quo are simply 
unworkable. Demanding the impossible is, on this view, an idle posture that smacks 
of self-indulgence. Rather than conjuring up blueprints for perfect societies, we should 
concern ourselves with tailoring solutions for specific situations at specific moments 
in time. In conjunction, the worries about the human capacity for peaceful coexistence 
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and steady development and the insistence on feasibility constraints form the 
structural backbone of realism’s putative aversion to utopia. 
Needless to say, there has been a lot of push-back against both claims. Accordingly, 
realists have been accused of standing in the way of progressive change by exhibiting 
acute “utopophobia”11. Others have maintained that realists are simply wrong to 
assume that political theory should be concerned with guiding action in the first place. 
Factoring in questions about motivation would beget a deplorably “cynical realism”12 
that takes too much for granted. 
Against this backdrop, let us now look further into two attempts to re-articulate the 
tension between realism and utopianism. I shall start with the notion that realism and 
utopianism can be harmoniously merged, a corollary of which seems to be that the 
narrative above is overdrawn. Perhaps the most developed proposal to this effect can 
be found in Erik Olin Wright’s Real Utopias Project.13 In collaboration with a group of 
political economists and philosophers over the past 20 years, Wright has endeavoured 
to recuperate emancipatory practices and institutions from within the capitalist 
system. The underlying research agenda affirms the 
tension between dreams and practice. It is grounded in the belief that what is 
pragmatically possible is not fixed independently of our imaginations, but is 
itself shaped by our visions. [..] What we need, then, is “real utopias”: utopian 
ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity, utopian 
destinations that have accessible waystations, utopian designs of institutions 
that can inform our practical tasks of navigating a world of imperfect 
conditions for social change.14 
Wright and his associates embrace the concept of a “real utopia” in order to explore 
the potential of actually existing practices and institutions to embody ideals of 
emancipation.15 Examples of what they deem real utopias comprise worker 
 7 
cooperatives, such as the Mondragón Corporation in the Basque country, 
participatory budgeting in the Global South or proposals for a Universal Basic Income. 
The Real Utopias Project appears to be animated by a yearning for reconciliation, for its 
“point is to sustain our deepest aspirations for a just and humane world that does not 
exist, while also pursuing the practical task of building real-world alternatives”16. 
Thus, Wright’s plea for “real utopianism” is driven by a desire to galvanize 
progressive action in a world that bears the hallmarks of injustices and exclusions. 
Wright’s thoughts on the astonishing recalcitrance of capitalism and the dire prospects 
of revolutionary action are symptomatic of this desire: transformation can only occur 
if progressive actors creatively combine anarchist (“interstitial”) with social-
democratic (“symbiotic”) techniques of upsetting capitalism.17 Capitalism is so deeply 
entrenched that nothing can seriously jeopardize its stability. Revolutionary action, 
which Wright associates with “ruptural” transformation, is bound to failure due to 
the fixity of the state apparatuses protecting the current order. Real utopias, however, 
manage to demonstrate that the hope for a different future can be kept alive, even if 
the option of a radical break with the status quo needs to be abandoned, or at least 
suspended for the time being. These initiatives aim to prove that “another world is 
possible”, to cite the evocative and powerful slogan of the World Social Forum.18 At 
their heart lies a belief in the force of prefigurative politics, which is also central to 
anarchist movements.19 
Let us juxtapose the attempted settlement between realism and utopia with another 
reading that starts from opposing premises. Judith Shklar, who has inspired a great 
many contemporary realists, delivered one of the most vociferous indictments against 
utopianism in the 20th Century.20 Her main objection to utopianism has also been 
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shared by several writers who have been collectively labelled – perhaps a bit heavy-
handedly, but nonetheless accurately – “Cold War liberals”21. Philosophers and 
historians such as Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper and Raymond Aron expressed a 
profound discontent with the adverse effects that designs for a perfect and static 
society can have on human freedom and pluralism. Shklar’s plea for a “liberalism of 
fear”, whose main characteristic lies in avoiding the “summum malum”22 of cruelty, 
underwrites this anti-utopianism. Utopian thinking, with its promise of future 
redemption, is a form of ideological extremism that needs to be contained by bearing 
witness to, and actively remembering, historical instances of evil. George Kateb 
captures this position when he writes that  
[t]he lessons of the past must be kept to mind because they chasten hope; they 
reduce expectation concerning the possibility of reaching an ideal society. […] 
To hope too much is to be guilty of forgetting the unspeakable, which 
happened in our lifetime, and will undoubtedly happen again, if it is not 
already taking place somewhere or other.23 
It is important to stress yet another factor that shaped the Cold War liberals’ aversion 
to utopianism: their fierce anti-communism. While Shklar, Berlin, Popper and Aron 
were, of course, primarily concerned with the epochal evil of Nazism, another 
incentive was their hostility to socialist ideas.24 Communism was charged with 
annihilating human freedom and pluralism by subjecting individuals to unfettered 
state control. Within oppressive structures, the anti-totalitarian argument goes, 
utopias play an instrumental role: they legitimize the severe hardship that collectives 
need to endure to rid themselves of injustices and exclusions.25 On this view, an 
intrinsic bond ties together utopianism and large-scale, eliminatory violence.26  
The systematic “preoccupation with political evil”27 has a further ramification: 
Despite their suspicion of utopianism in all its manifestations, Shklar et al were 
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convinced that fictional depictions of evil may serve an important goal – they caution 
people about the grave perils of social engineering.28 Dystopias cover “feasible 
negative visions of social and political development, cast principally in fictional 
form”29; as such, they are supremely suited to bolster the liberalism of fear. Many 
contemporary realists have been swayed by this fatalistic way of conceiving utopia.30 
While the ensuing discussion deviates from both the conciliatory and the antagonistic 
reading of the relationship between realism and utopianism, I do not mean to 
insinuate that there is nothing we could learn from them. Wright’s attempt at fusing 
realism and utopianism has been so inspirational because it rightly underscores the 
transformational effects that progressive social experiments, enacted both within and 
at the margins of the current hegemonic order, can have in the here and now. 
Similarly, Shklar’s admonition that utopia’s seductive aura can be evoked to incite 
violence reminds us that utopian thinking is far from innocuous; it remains a 
dangerous and risky enterprise. 
However, both Wright et al and Sklar et al ultimately misconstrue the relationship 
between realism and utopianism. The first, conciliatory interpretation suffers from an 
excessive confidence in the resources of the hegemonic order to better itself. Although 
Wright, and those working on similar projects, insist on the continuous strain between 
the ideal and the mundane, one cannot escape the impression that, in their 
ameliorative endeavour, too much concession is being made to what is feasible in the 
world as we know it. Recall how Wright’s focus on the piecemeal manner in which 
utopian ideals need to be implemented is tethered to a prior appraisal of “viable 
alternatives”: without it, utopian thinking would degenerate into immature 
hypothesizing. Yet, this framing in terms of viability too readily accepts the 
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constraints set by current configurations of power. It truncates the utopian impulse. 
This becomes evident in Wright’s bleak outlook on system-wide transformation. 
Given the overall resilience of capitalism, it would be hubristic to militate for social 
change based on “rupturing” the present state of affairs. In the end, “real utopias” are 
therefore predicated on accepting the deferral of radical change.31 Call this 
conservative bent the core of the Wright et al misconception. 
The second, antagonistic interpretation suffers from a different flaw: it abridges the 
internal diversity of utopianism by viewing it exclusively through the prism of anti-
totalitarianism. Due to their running together of utopian thinking with social 
engineering, Shklar et al tend to unduly stress the dangers and risks characteristic of 
utopias, without granting the possibility that utopias might serve other, perhaps more 
salutary purposes than conveying schematic blueprints for upending society as a 
whole. What is more, the perspective of dystopic liberalism remains permeated by an 
anti-communist animus, weaving together utopianism, state control and destructive 
violence. For Cold War liberals, social engineering is the prerogative of the totalitarian 
states that have eviscerated individual liberties in the recent past. But note that such a 
disparaging assessment of utopianism is contingent on wilfully ignoring how 
capitalism and liberalism, too, mobilize social engineering for their projects, albeit in 
surreptitious ways that are difficult to unpick through an anti-totalitarian framework. 
In that sense, Shklar et al are, despite their credentials as precursors of contemporary 
realism, guilty of violating an incontrovertible requisite of realist political theory: that 
of reckoning with the world as it actually is, and not as we would want it to be. 
Polemically put, dystopic liberalism’s account of human action itself looks like the 
result of wishful thinking. The notion that realism and utopianism are polar opposites 
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is therefore plausible only if we subscribe to the one-sided – and unrealistic – story 
that the Cold War liberals sought to propagate.32 That is the crux of the Shklar et al 
misconception. 
III. The Real Place of Utopia: Antinomian and Critical 
In contradistinction with these two readings, I now want to gesture towards an 
alternative interpretation that paves the way for a more convincing approach to the 
problem. The chief claim here is that no necessary link exists between realism and 
anti-utopianism. On this view, realism, properly understood, occupies an often 
overlooked space, whose boundaries still need mapping: between wishful thinking 
and hopeless pessimism.33 
Raymond Geuss has taken decisive steps towards this interpretation. Although he 
probed the ramifications of a negative dialectics for utopianism in his earlier work, 
asserting with Adorno that a “prohibition forbids one to elaborate a positive image of 
utopia”34, these scattered remarks on the negativity of utopia never amounted to more 
than a tangential treatment.35 In a number of recent writings, however, Geuss seeks to 
systematically distinguish sound utopianism from other, deficient forms of reasoning 
about politics. 
He starts by declaring “wishful thinking” an illusion that remains alien to realism’s 
primary concern with understanding and assessing concrete power configurations 
and ideological formations.36 Are we then to gather that all kinds of utopian imagining 
are intrinsically prone to succumbing to “Platonic optimism”? What makes Geuss’s 
approach so appealing is his assertion that we need a differentiated account of the 
various roles of wishing in politics. To wish for something, understood here broadly 
as the imaginative anticipation of an alternative future, is a basic human desire that 
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can either engender destructive self-delusion or productive self-empowerment. As a 
consequence, not all forms of wishing are deleterious from the point of view of realist 
political theory because what 
we in hindsight call “reality” was in the past often a highly indefinite future 
[…]. Those who argue against wishful thinking do not after all necessarily want 
to abolish or restrict wishes themselves. Someone who takes into account the 
world we live in with a sober eye might still without difficulty also harbour 
“utopian” wishes, that is, wishes he know are not to be realized.37 
Against this backdrop, Geuss proceeds to distinguish more sharply between two 
varieties of utopianism: one that employs wishful thinking and thus remains at odds 
with a realist orientation in political theory; and one that facilitates the coherent 
articulation of demands for radical transformation, which is entirely in line with 
realism’s emancipatory agenda.38 Interestingly, just like his intellectual bugbear, John 
Rawls, Geuss turns to E. H. Carr to investigate the relationship between realism and 
utopian thinking in earnest.39 The overall aim here is to accurately identify the place 
of the imagination, and especially of utopian thinking, within realism. His more 
specific goal is twofold: firstly, to demonstrate Carr’s object of rebuke was moralism, 
rather than utopianism; and, secondly, that it is conceivable to salvage a meaning of 
utopia that would not fall prey to the dangerous misapprehension of “wishful 
thinking”. Let us scrutinize more closely the second of these claims. 
The standard realist critique of utopian thinking, as remarked above, is based on the 
assumption that utopias envision perfect states of social order and permanent peace, 
but fall short of specifying how one would have to proceed to reach those points in 
history without obliterating human freedom and pluralism. This orientation towards 
an unambiguously good goal makes them convenient vehicles for totalitarian 
domination: the preoccupation with a future telos can easily be invoked to vindicate 
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all kinds of sacrifice that would have to be made to finally attain redemption. Change 
through contestation, conflict and dissent is then entirely absent from traditional 
utopias. 
Utopian thinking of this kind is, in Geuss’s slightly idiosyncratic terminology, “form-
based”40 in that it exclusively concentrates on delineating a formal outline of a better 
future. The grave error in this view of utopia as a blueprint for a just society is that it 
naively assumes its self-realizing power. Aligning himself with Marx and Engels, who 
derided utopian socialists like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen for discarding the 
necessity of revolutionary action, Geuss maintains it is a sure sign of wishful thinking 
to presume “that it is ‘enough’ for a certain state of affairs to be seen to be good, for 
people to aspire to realise it”41.  
Geuss juxtaposes this conventional view with another way of reflecting on utopia that 
is geared towards a contextual analysis of the social world as we know it. Epitomized 
by the work of German anarchist Gustav Landauer, this “content-based” version 
envisages “the task of utopian speculation as not to construct the image of a possible 
perfect world but as a focused study of those human desires and needs that continue 
to torment us but are incapable of being satisfied under present social 
circumstances”42. On this account, what matters is not so much the end state which 
utopian thinking summons, but rather “a more historically informed analysis of 
existing, but changing, dissatisfactions and needs, and possible (contextually and 
historically specific) ways of satisfying them”43. Despite being rooted in the real world, 
this perspective departs from Wright’s ameliorative endeavour in that it does not 
deem the prevailing order’s array of possibilities worth extending. 
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Geuss thus objects to form-based utopianism because it reifies the satisfaction of 
human “desires, needs and aspirations” by constructing a perfect world. Utopianism 
of this variety prompts a-historical wishful thinking, which contravenes the main 
thrust of realism. The reference to Landauer’s distinction between two kinds of 
historical force, topia (the here and now) and utopia (the vision of an alternative world), 
then helps clarify how Geuss conceives of “content-based” utopianism. Landauer 
himself outlines the distinction in the following words: 
Topia is responsible for affluence and satiation as well as for hunger, for shelter 
as well as for homelessness. Topia organizes all matters of communality, wages 
war, exports and imports, closes and opens borders. […] Topia’s relative 
stability gradually changes until a point of labile balance is reached. The 
changes in topia are caused by utopia. […] Utopia means a combination of 
individual and heterogeneous manifestations of will that unite and organize in 
a moment of crisis to form a passionate demand for a new social form: a topia 
without ills and injustices. […] Utopia is a combination of ambitions that will 
never reach their goals; they will always create but a new topia.44 
The constant battle between topia and utopia explains how utopianism can be worked 
out in such a way as to avoid a-historical wishful thinking. Geuss proposes that “at 
any given time a given population will have (various) conceptions of what is harmful 
or unjust and these changing conceptions provide the kernel of utopian aspiration. 
The state of affairs intended in these utopian strivings will not ever be fully realised, 
and so their significance consists simply in driving Humanity on from one Topia […] 
to the next”45. 
Hence, utopias are contextually specific forms of critique that demand radical 
transformation, without invoking the future existence of a just society. They are 
antinomian in character, eroding the stability of the status quo. What is more, utopias 
in Landauer’s sense are essentially dynamic insofar as they stand in a dialectical 
relationship to topia’s reactionary forces. In strongly rebuffing positive blueprints, 
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Geuss seeks to associate utopian thinking with particular desires, needs and 
aspirations that arise from the resistance to specific constellations of power. As a 
consequence, we end up with a conception of political theory that endeavours to be 
simultaneously “fully realistic and fully utopian”46. 
Although Geuss’s sophisticated notion of realism is highly illuminating for our 
purpose, it also displays two weaknesses. Firstly, Geuss seems largely oblivious to the 
wide-ranging debate in utopian studies, which has the undeniable effect that his 
observations on two kinds of utopianism replicate a vital point that has already been 
made numerous times in a similar fashion. Without wanting to erase the significant 
differences between them, let us quickly rehearse a few analogous claims: Miguel 
Abensour speaks of “eternal utopia” as a conservative trope that necessarily entails 
an appeal to perfect order, which he contrasts with the concept of a “persistent 
utopia”: the “wish for the advent of a radical alterity here and now”47. Russell Jacoby 
differentiates between the blueprint and the iconoclastic traditions of utopian 
thinking, discarding the former as potentially authoritarian and commending the 
latter for its “resistance to representing the future”48. Finally, inspired by Ernst Bloch’s 
magisterial The Principle of Hope, Ruth Levitas separates the conventional 
understanding of utopianism as the “imaginative construction of whole other worlds” 
from a rival account, which she designates “looking for the blue”49, a mindful 
anticipation of a reconstituted society that is concrete, rather than abstract. 
While Geuss’s reluctance to enter into a dialogue with these allied voices is surprising, 
it does not undermine the gist of his proposal. In fact, we can with relative ease 
perceive how the debate in utopian studies may speak to the controversy around 
realism. Even a superficial glance at their positions reveals that Abensour, Jacoby and 
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Levitas zoom in on exactly the same fault-line that Geuss, too, identifies as the crack 
through which the falsely unitary image of utopianism can be shattered. We may 
therefore aver with Abensour, Jacoby and Levitas that, for utopian thinking to 
establish a place within realist political theory, it must be of the persistent, iconoclastic, 
“looking for the blue” variety. The blind spot in the dystopic-liberal critique (the 
Shklar et al fallacy) is that it collapses all kinds of utopianism into eternal blueprints 
of whole other worlds. We can now grasp that this is a caricature of utopian thinking’s 
diversity. 
Yet, there is a second shortcoming, which strikes me as more serious and in need of 
rectification. Although he gestures, in his essays on Paul Celan’s poetry and 
Dadaism’s aesthetics, towards the capacity of modern art to foster utopianism of a 
negative kind50, Geuss never engages in earnest with literary utopias to redeem this 
claim. This is a missed opportunity, for several contemporary writers of utopian 
fiction have tried to tell stories that exhibit precisely those features that Geuss 
foregrounds as the critical and antinomian elements of “content-based” utopianism. 
They trace the fine line between hopeless pessimism and wishful thinking that is 
characteristic of realist political theory’s radical spirit, shunning the alluring, yet 
treacherous resolutions of “real utopias” and “dystopic liberalism”. China Miéville, 
whose oeuvre is paradigmatic of this unorthodox approach to utopian thinking, 
expresses this view excellently: 
If an alternative to this world were inconceivable, how could we change it? But 
utopia has its limits: utopia can be toxic. We need utopia, but to try to think 
utopia, in this world, without rage, without fury, is an indulgence we can’t 
afford. In the face of what is done, we cannot think utopia without hate. Even 
our ends-of-the-world are too Whiggish. […] Here instead is to antinomian 
utopia. A hope that abjures the hope of those in power.51 
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IV. The Dispossessed as an Ambiguous Utopia 
This section unpacks the critical and antinomian features of Ursula K. Le Guin’s opus, 
spelling out in more detail what is involved in emboldening a “hope that abjures the 
hope of those in power”.52 The Dispossessed, originally published in 1974 and 
immediately awarded the Hugo and Nebula Prizes (the science fiction genre’s highest 
accolades) tells the story of two societies on twin planets: Anarres and Urras. Anarres 
is inhabited by the descendants of a group of anarcho-syndicalist revolutionaries, who 
split from Urras during an uprising, which took place approximately 200 years before 
the story begins. 
The inspirational leader behind the uprising was a thinker called Odo, whose 
philosophy forms the ideological basis of the anarchist society on Anarres. Social ties 
on Anarres are supposed to facilitate absolute individual liberty without any coercion; 
there are no laws and no police to uphold public order (although there are therapeutic 
interventions on individuals who distance themselves too much from Odonianism); 
no government to issue executive directives; personal property cannot be acquired or 
sold. Since their planet is desert-like, scarcity of resources is a major challenge to the 
survival and welfare of the Anarresti. Urras, on the other hand, is divided into several 
states with separate and competing governments, two of which (A-Io and Thu) play 
the role of global super-powers. Its material resources are far more copious than 
Anarres’s. The inhabitants of Urras, with the exceptions of a few political renegades, 
reject the principles of Odonianism and happily embrace wealth and abundance. 
Ever since the settlement on Anarres, the members of this anarchic community have 
entertained only very limited relations with their antagonists. Their main reason to 
communicate has been for the sake of sending precious minerals to Urras, in exchange 
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for essential goods that the Anarresti themselves are incapable of producing due to 
their lack of technological know-how. This trade is viewed with suspicion on both 
sides: “Seven generations of peace had not brought trust.”53 The anarcho-syndicalists 
on Anarres feel highly resentful about their dependency on commerce with the 
“propertarian” regime on Urras; the Urrasti treat Anarres like a subsidiary mining 
colony from which precious materials can be extracted. 
Against this setting, we encounter an Anarresti scientist called Shevek, who has been 
tasked with deepening the connections between the two societies. For this purpose, 
Shevek, an authority in the physics of space travel searching for a “General Temporal 
Theory”, visits Urras and starts a conversation with the scientists there. The ensuing 
plot, whose structure alternates between earlier events set on Anarres and later ones 
set on Urras, narrates the intellectual, personal and political development of Shevek. 
As an extraordinarily gifted scientist, he runs into serious problems on his home 
planet. Odonianism teaches all Anarresti to prioritize the needs of the community over 
individual preferences. This manifest itself not only in their social practices, such as 
communal child-rearing, but also in their newly engineered language, “Pravic”, which 
contains no words indicating property or authority.54 “Egoizing” – the symbolic 
proclamation of personal possession – is regarded with suspicion on Anarres. From 
his childhood onwards, Shevek becomes entangled in various incidents that 
demonstrate his uncomfortable position on Anarres. After a stint in the countryside 
doing menial community service, he is finally admitted to the Central Institute of 
Sciences, where his mentor Sabul introduces him to research of physicists from Urras, 
which later leads to Shevek’s mission visiting the twin planet. Several of Shevek’s 
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childhood friends express their disgruntlement with the sclerotic nature of Odonian 
ideology.55 
On Urras, Shevek’s first experiences are by and large rewarding, so much so that he 
believes to have arrived in an idyllic paradise free from communitarian pressure. Ieu 
Eun University, where he is to be based, is a fertile ground for scientific endeavours, 
which contrasts with the atmosphere on Anarres. Soon, however, Shevek becomes 
aware that his stay on Urras is severely restricted: he can initially only get in touch 
with other scientists at the University. In the course of his stay, it becomes evident that 
Shevek’s hosts have other motives for inviting him than simply improving relations 
between the two societies: the “General Temporal Theory” would permit the Urrasti 
to unlock the secrets of space travel; for them, Shevek is primarily a potential source 
of arcane knowledge that they themselves cannot master. 
Disillusioned by the egotistic and profit-driven motives of his host scientists, Shevek 
establishes contact with rebel groups on Urras that secretly follow the principles of 
Odonianism and finally asks for asylum at the Terran embassy. The book ends with 
Shevek realizing that the rapprochement between Anarres and Urras will not come 
about as easily as he had envisaged. He returns to his home planet, anticipating to 
break through the walls that separate Anarres from the rest of the Universe. 
Given the wide variety of interpretive engagements with The Dispossessed, it is 
unavoidable to limit our reading to a few key motifs that are especially relevant to the 
paper’s theoretical interest. The first such theme pertains to the specific character of 
the utopia itself. It has often been observed that the book’s subtitle – “An Ambiguous 
Utopia” – gives away the narrative’s main feature. As evidenced by Shevek’s assertive 
and tortured persona, Anarres is not at all portrayed as an unequivocally virtuous, 
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prosperous or Arcadian place. Rather, it is described as a place riven by 
contradictions, anxieties and apprehensions. What is more, Le Guin applies a subtle 
brush to the representation of Urrasti society, too. While Shevek’s initial impression 
of the “propertarians” is enthusiastic, his positive views dramatically deteriorate once 
he becomes acquainted with his hosts’ alienating and shallow lifestyle. 
The Dispossessed’s ambiguity with regard to these alternative worlds is the main reason 
why the novel has been credited with inaugurating a new strand within the genre: 
critical utopias deal with 
non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in 
time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as 
better than contemporary society but with difficult problems that the described 
society may or may not be able to solve and which takes a critical view of the 
Utopian genre.56 
Critical utopias are thus alert to the dangers and risks attached to static blueprints of 
perfect societies. Accordingly, The Dispossessed can be said to be critical in at least two 
different senses: it estranges us from the here and now by conjuring alternative 
worlds, and at the same time reflexively sheds light on the function of utopian 
thinking itself. Both its content and its form are critically inflected. As Simon Stow 
discerns, the effectiveness of this doubly critical thrust “emerges not from simply 
constructing another world and reading-off the lessons for our own, but rather by 
traveling between them and using the perspectives gained from evaluating both 
realities in tandem with the other”57. 
The metaphor of travelling reflects an understanding of utopian fiction’s relation to 
the real world that we encountered above in Landauer’s thoughts on revolutionary 
agency: insofar as a utopia accumulates all the negative tendencies that a hegemonic 
order (a topia, on Landauer’s account) cannot fully absorb, its concrete meaning 
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materialises out of a struggle with the existing power structures. The Dispossessed can 
therefore be interpreted as having relevance for politics, here and now, to the extent 
that we accept from the start its necessarily indeterminate impact, mediated by the 
contradictions, anxieties and apprehensions of our time. Viewed from this angle, it 
becomes clear how thoroughly Le Guin breaks with the conventions of the traditional 
utopia. In Laurence Davis’s words,  
[u]nlike the didactic lessons of the perfectionist utopia, the insights to be 
gleaned from the Le Guinean utopia are ambiguous. For Le Guin does not tell 
her readers what to think. Rather, by using her fictional skills to enlarge the 
field of historical possibility, she challenges us to reevaluate our present from 
the perspective of the promises of, and aspirations to, emancipation that have 
not yet been realized.58 
Le Guin’s prose hence exemplifies how storytelling can have a political effect beyond 
crude didacticism. Avoiding the pitfall of what Geuss calls “form-based utopianism”, 
The Dispossessed is a novel of change and transformation. Shevek’s physical and 
intellectual journey from Anarres to Urras and back again, can be read as an invitation 
to accept the necessarily dynamic character of utopian thinking itself.  
The espousal of dialectics can be further teased out by considering the “General 
Temporal Theory”, which Shevek attempts to develop during his trip. Its aim is to 
offer an account of time that pays equal attention to sequency and simultaneity. That 
is to say, Shevek’s scientific project seeks to capture both the fugitive and the 
continuous aspects of identity such that being and becoming are each given their due. 
The “General Temporal Theory” is thus supposed to synthesize contradictory 
viewpoints about reality into a coherent whole. This goal is mirrored in the “ultimate 
dialectical unity of the novelistic plot”59: towards the end of The Dispossessed, the two 
storylines converge and the narrative circle is closed. The reader thereby comes to 
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comprehend why Shevek needed to leave Anarres and why he ultimately had to 
return to his home planet. 
Finally, let us note that The Dispossessed is undeniably not a dystopia. Although both 
Anarres and Urras are each deeply flawed societies, Le Guin makes no secret of where 
her own preferences lie and why she repudiates hopeless pessimism about visions of 
anarchism. Much has been made of Le Guin’s deep and sustained engagement with 
key authors of the anarchist tradition, such as Kropotkin, Morris and Goldman.60 It 
will, then, come as no surprise that at the heart of her depiction of Anarres lies a 
tension, embodied by Shevek himself, which is pivotal to the very idea of anarchist 
communism: between the longing for communal solidarity across society and a desire 
for individual self-fulfilment.61 
The crucial point here is that The Dispossessed probes this tension in all its intricacy, 
without fatalistically accepting its ultimate destructiveness. Le Guin is adamant about 
her belief that a harmonization of solidarity and self-fulfilment remains a valuable 
political objective that can only be approximated through ongoing negotiations of 
personal freedom and mutual interdependence. This becomes particularly evident in 
the novel’s celebration of the indeterminacy of human action, which contrasts starkly 
with conventional utopias’ insistence on stability and perfection.62 
The Dispossessed, in sum, is anything but the result of wishful thinking. It confronts the 
immense dangers and risks of social dreaming head-on. Le Guin’s own stance towards 
the book’s open, rather than happy ending corroborates this suspicion.63 Yet, the novel 
also refuses to extol hopeless pessimism concerning the possibility of radical 
transformation. With Miéville we might thus conclude that its main commitment is to 
forcefully preserve a “hope that abjures the hope of those in power”. Nurturing such 
 23 
hope is, paradoxically, premised on abstaining from narratively prescribing its 
definitive redemption. 
V. “Learning from Other Worlds”: A Primer for Open-Ended 
Conversations 
The paper’s final section further draws out some of the implications that reading The 
Dispossessed might have for the debate around realism in political theory. Le Guin’s 
novel, or so I have contended, can deliver vital impulses to propel the debate beyond 
the orbit of the currently dominant Methodenstreit between moralists and their 
detractors. One such impulse simply stems from the attention I have directed towards 
the genre of literary utopias. Given utopianism’s “three faces” (theory, art and lived 
experience), it is astonishing how little appreciation political theorists have for fiction 
writing when they weigh the strengths and weaknesses of utopianism. Contrary to 
what most participants in this debate seem to believe, utopias are not only a topic for 
political theory; they also include stories that form a canon of at least 500 years. This 
uncontentious observation alone should give pause to those who subsume utopianism 
under such narrow categories as “ideal theory” or “fact-insensitive morality”. The 
diversity of utopianism thus needs underscoring in a scholarly discussion that has 
been diminished by an obsession with methodological issues. In that regard, political 
theorists have much to learn from recent debates in utopian studies. 
It goes without saying that Le Guin’s subtle and multifaceted narrative reveals just 
one auspicious avenue for enlarging the extant controversy around realism. Consider 
further the following contemporary authors, who are all in some way heirs to The 
Dispossessed: Apart from Miéville’s brand of “weird fiction”64, which has already 
become the object of academic discussion65, we could also contemplate Margaret 
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Atwood’s “ustopias”66 – her distinctive blending of utopia and dystopia. Yet another 
source of inspiration might be Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars Trilogy67, which riffs on 
ideas of radical democracy that have been widely discussed over the past 25 years.68  
What all these writers have to offer to political theory is a unique take on the challenge 
of productively engaging the imagination such that the structural limitations of our 
conceptual frameworks become apparent. They prompt us to look differently at “what 
is, what might be, and the relationship between the two”69, without scripting a 
positive blueprint for a perfect society; neither do they switch to a dystopian 
perspective, as some of the Cold War liberals would have preferred. Rather, these 
authors fire up processes of “cognitive estrangement”, whereby the present state of 
affairs is seen from new and startling perspective, enabled by what Darko Suvin calls 
science fiction’s novum.70 Utopias of the critical and antinomian variety hence demand 
the impossible, yet refrain from bestowing the imaginary world with uniform and 
monolithic features that would curb their readers’ exegetical freedom. Their central 
feature lies in the “capacity to mediate between […] the world that is and that which 
is coming into being.”71 
The best formulation of this dialectics can be discerned in the work of Fredric Jameson, 
who conceives of utopianism as a formal technique of breaking the spell of the 
present.72 For Jameson, utopia’s effect of estrangement targets the ideological illusion 
of the unchangeability of the status quo: 
Disruption is, then, the name for a new discursive strategy, and Utopia is the 
form such disruption necessarily takes. And this is now the temporal situation 
in which the Utopian form proper […] has its political role to play, and in fact 
becomes a new kind of content in its own right. For it is the very principle of 
the radical break as such, its possibility, which is reinforced by the Utopian 
form, which insists that its radical difference is possible and that a break is 
necessary. The Utopian form itself is the answer to the universal ideological 
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conviction that no alternative is possible, that there is no alternative to the 
system. But it asserts this by forcing us to think the break itself, and not by 
offering a more traditional picture of what things would be like after the 
break.73 
Importantly, then, utopias have a distinctively negative thrust: they “dissolve” and 
“neutralize” the world from which they depart.74 Hence, in his interpretation of The 
Dispossessed, Jameson identifies the novel’s narrative device as “world reduction”75. 
To reduce the world involves an abstraction from the hegemonic constraints of the 
present day. As the prior section has shown, Shevek’s universe contains plenty 
examples of such “world reduction”. Recall, for instance, that Anarres is a barren 
planet, plagued by material scarcity and environmental hazard, which contrasts not 
only with the overabundance of goods on Urras, but also with the consumerism 
endemic in late capitalist societies, such as the USA.76 
Le Guin thus demonstrates that a different universe can be imagined where the 
prevailing world order is comprehensively unsettled. What we find instead of that 
order is a fragile social experiment, full of “misfits and oddballs in which the 
constraints for uniformization and conformity have been removed”77. The Dispossessed 
adumbrates a world where individualism and the common good thrive at the same 
time – not through an enforced harmonization, which would abolish the inherent 
pluralism of human relations, but through their constant negotiation. 
Yet, the fictional dissolution and neutralization of reality hinges on a paradoxical 
operation, for the utopian desire’s negative drive is by default ideologically 
imbricated, conditioned and moulded by social conflicts here and now. In his 
engagement with Adorno’s minimalist notion of utopia as the absence of hunger and 
violence78, Jameson makes this point by underscoring the “inescapable situatedness in 
class, race and gender, in nationality, in history”79 of all human beings. Due to this 
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context-dependence, we are able to detect traces of the status quo in even the most 
outlandish scenarios depicted in utopias. The disruptive energy of abstraction can 
hence be channelled by identifying the concrete power structures that imaginary 
worlds such as Anarres or Urras seek to destabilise. In that sense, Le Guin sketches, 
to again quote Lawrence Davis, a “grounded utopia” that intensifies 
imaginative awareness of neglected or suppressed possibilities for qualitatively 
better forms of living latent in the present. […] It does so in part by illuminating 
the heterodox and the extraordinary in the seemingly ordinary, and by 
reminding us that past, present, and future all contain multiple possibilities far 
in excess of seemingly fixed actualities.80  
This approach to utopian literature reverberates with Geuss’s reflections on the 
mutually supportive relationship between realism and utopianism. More ambitiously, 
its formal features can assist us in remedying some of the blind spots in Geuss’s vision. 
“Learning from other worlds”81, then, entails an imaginative undertaking that closely 
resembles Landauer’s historical reconstruction of the never-ending antagonism 
between topia and utopia. If utopias are best understood as contextually specific forms 
of critique, then we need narratives that employ the device of “world reduction”, 
without indulging in escapist fantasies. As both Geuss’s reflections and my 
interpretation of The Dispossessed have revealed, only an anchoring of the utopian 
impulse in the concrete desires, needs and aspirations of individuals and collectives 
inoculates these visionary strivings against the temptation of wishful thinking. 
This last point about the necessary avoidance of escapism is of crucial importance for 
the argument proposed in this essay. Critical, antinomian utopias disavow wishful 
thinking, unfolding instead a space in which an oppositional, counter-hegemonic 
hope can be nurtured. This space is vital to the prospects of a realist political theory 
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that rejects anti-utopianism. Echoing Geuss’s views, Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo 
succinctly recapitulates this thought when he contends that  
realism entails imagination not in order to idealize the present or abstractly 
posit an ideal situation but to rationally inquire why things are what they are 
and how they could be otherwise. […] Precisely because it refuses to relinquish 
utopia, it [realism] resists any accommodation to the ruling powers, as it 
relentlessly debunks the quest for silver linings. Instead it highlights power 
differentials and dispenses with consolations about them.82 
This passage should not be read as implying that the imagination offers a panacea to 
all the problems facing realist political theory. The research agenda undergirding the 
realist project comprises various other instruments, such as ideology critique and 
genealogy, that cannot be captured in terms of utopianism.83 However, at a basic level, 
utopianism and realism sustain and fortify each other insofar as each element of the 
dyad puts a check on the other’s limitations, while at the same time maintaining its 
distinct identity.  
The advantages of this picture emerge once we compare it to the resolutions of “real 
utopia” and “dystopic liberalism”. As stated above, both Wright et al and Shklar et al 
appear to distort the complexity of utopian thinking, but for entirely different reasons. 
Wright et al assume that acting in an unjust world necessarily depends on the 
teleologically assured existence of social initiatives that prefigure ideals of 
emancipation and progress. Quite possibly against their intentions, the fusing 
together of realism and utopia thereby undercuts utopianism’s full potential by 
folding its radical impulse into the real world of compromise and concession. Shklar 
et al, on the other side, construe utopianism in much too a restricted fashion, by 
equating it exclusively with static, perfectionist schemas that allow for no change 
whatsoever. In so doing, they endeavour to curtail the literary imagination for the 
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sake of protecting individual autonomy and human plurality against the totalitarian 
folly of social engineering. 
The critical and antinomian utopia, refracted through the theoretical framework of a 
sober realism, manages to defy both the conservative pull of appeals to “real utopias” 
and the baseless fear-mongering of “dystopic liberalism”. As I claimed in my analysis 
of The Dispossessed, it is sensible to interpret the novel as a plea for radical 
transformation, which simultaneously stays faithful to the basic premises of realism. 
This is the case because Le Guin’s novel remains entwined, in obvious and less 
obvious ways, with the world it seeks to negate and dissolve. By defamiliarizing us 
from the status quo, utopias can hence induce the kind of split from reality that makes 
an informed understanding of, and critical engagement with, the world possible. 
Terry Eagleton speaks to this issue when he observes that 
[i]f the notion of utopia is to have force, it could only be as a way of 
interrogating the present which unlocks its dominative logic by discerning the 
dim outline of an alternative already implicit within it. […] Authentic utopian 
thought concerns itself with that which is encoded within the logic of a system 
which, extrapolated in a certain direction, has the power to undo it.84 
In conclusion, this essay has argued that The Dispossessed is emblematic of a wider 
range of utopian fiction, which grants political theory more than simply a steady 
supply of innovative replies to old problems, such as, for example, the friction 
between a longing for communal solidarity across society and a desire for individual 
self-fulfilment. Rather, the critical and antinomian utopia affords us, more 
profoundly, with another way of seeing that remains stably anchored, due to its 
ambiguity and dynamism, in the here and now. Le Guin and other authors of utopian 
fiction therefore convey to us what at this point in time, where the very idea of 
alternatives is routinely denied, seems most indispensable: new questions, rather than 
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novel answers. This is precisely why realists would be well advised to forsake their 
pessimism about human nature, brush off the charge of conservatism and commence 
taking the imagination, in all its dimensions, seriously. 
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